James Hornsby v.CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a Utah corporation sole, CHARLES GIBLETT, JOHN SUTTON, and JOHN DOES, I through X, inclusive : Brief of Respondent Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints and Charles Giblett by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1988
James Hornsby v.CORPORATION OF THE
PRESIDING BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF
JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a
Utah corporation sole, CHARLES GIBLETT,
JOHN SUTTON, and JOHN DOES, I through X,
inclusive : Brief of Respondent Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints and Charles Giblett
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James R. Black, Mary R. Rudolph; Black & Moore; Laura Boyer; attorney for plaintiff- appellant.
Stephen G. Morgan, Mark L. Anderson; Morgan, Scalley & Reading; Attorneys for respondent-
defendant Sutton; Allen M. Swan; Kirotn, McConkie & Bushnell; attorneys for respondents-
Defendants Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Churcl of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
and Charles Giblett
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Hornsby v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, No. 880031.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1899
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCI iMirrr; 
K F U IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
50 
.A10 
DOCKETJ$$?S 
Appeal From 
Third District Court, 
vs. : Honorable Timothy Hanson 
District Court Judge 
No. C-83-5019 
Appellant-Plaintiff/ 
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING 
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS 
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 
a Utah corporation sole, 
CHARLES GIBLETT, JOHN SUTTON, 
and JOHN DOES, I through X, 
inclusive, 
Respondents-Defendants 
Utah Supreme Court 
No. 860007 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS CORPORATION OF THE 
PRESIDING BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST 
OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS AND CHARLES GIBLETT 
Allen M. Swan 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondents-
Defendants Corporation of the 
Presiding Bishop of the Churcl 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints and Charles Giblett 
Stephen G. Morgan 
Mark L. Anderson 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
261 East 300 South, Second Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondents-
Defendants Sutton 
James R. Black 
Mary R. Rudolph 
BLACK & MOORE 
261 East Broadway, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant-
Plaintiff 
Laura Boyer 
3167 West 4700 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118 
Attorney for Appellant-
Plaintiff 
Clerk Stp'diue 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES HORNSBY, 
Appellant-Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING 
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS 
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 
a Utah corporation sole, 
CHARLES GIBLETT, JOHN SUTTON, 
and JOHN DOES, I through X, 
inclusive, 
Respondents-Defendants, 
Appeal From 
Third District Court, 
Honorable Timothy Hanson 
District Court Judge 
No. C-83-5019 
Utah Supreme Court 
No. 860007 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS CORPORATION OF THE 
PRESIDING BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST 
OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS AND CHARLES GIBLETT 
James R. Black 
Mary R. Rudolph 
BLACK & MOORE 
261 East Broadway, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant-
Plaintiff 
Laura Boyer 
3167 West 4700 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118 
Attorney for Appellant-
Plaintiff 
Allen M. Swan 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondents-
Defendants Corporation of the 
Presiding Bishop of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints and Charles Giblett 
Stephen G. Morgan 
Mark L. Anderson 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
261 East 300 South, Second Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondents-
Defendants Sutton 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 4 
ARGUMENT 9 
POINT I: THERE WAS NO REVERSIBLE ERROR BY THE 
TRIAL COURT JUDGE IN THE COURT'S 
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF PROSPECTIVE 
JURORS REGARDING POTENTIAL PARTIALITY 
DUE TO INVOLVEMENT WITH THE DEFENDANT 
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING BISHOP 
OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF 
LATTER-DAY SAINTS 9 
POINT II: THERE WAS NO REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
ALLOWING DEFENSE COUNSEL TO REFER 
TO HIS CLIENT AS "THE WELFARE 
FARM" 17 
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED 
TO GIVE AN INSTRUCTION ON RES IPSA 
LOQUITUR 18 
POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
REFUSING TO GIVE AN INSTRUCTION ON 
NEGLIGENCE PER SE 26 
POINT V: THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE TRIAL 
COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE AN INSTRUC-
TION ON STRICT LIABILITY 29 
CONCLUSION 34 
ADDENDUM I 36 
ADDENDUM II 38 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Pa^e 
Akin v. Berkshire, (NM Ct. of App.) 512 P.2d 
1261, decided July 18, 1973 23 
Ballhorst v. Honor-Foreman-Caley, Inc., 207 Kan. 
89, 484 P.2d 38 21 
Barnes v. Frank, 472 P.2d 745 (Ct. of App. Col., 
1970) 24, 26 
Brauner v. Peterson, 16 Wash. App. 53 1, 557 p,2d 35 9 
(1976) " 23 
Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, 
143 A.2d 627, 631 (MD 1958) 9, 11, 12 
Eisenhuth v. Moneyhom, (1954) 161 Ohio St. 367, 
119 NE 2d 440, paragraph 3 of the syllabus . . / 
Flynn v. Lindfield, 6 Ariz. App. 459, 433 P.2d 
639 (1967) '. . . . . ,34 
Kusy v. K-Mart Apparel Corporation, 6.-1 P.2d 
1232 (Ut., 1984) . . . . . . . . 21, 22 
Macho v. Mahowald, 374 NW 2d 312, Ct. -.t Ape. Mian. 
(1985) 31, 32 
Maltby v. Cox Construction Co., Utah, 598 P.2d 336, 
341 (1979) If. 
McCray v. Abrams, 576 F. Supp. 1244 • :>.\.^. 
(1983) . "." . . . . . 16 
McCullough v. Gatch, 161 SE 2d ' <. S ". 19t>&, . . . 28 
Mitchell v. Ridgeway, 77 NM 24- •*_. ._;{ """"3 
(1966) . . . . 23 
People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 148 Cal. Rptr. 
890, 583 P.2d 748 (1978) . . . 16 
Reed v. Molnar, 67 Ohio St. 2d 76, 423 NE 2d 
140 (Ohio, 1981) ,,26 
Renfro v. J.D. Coggins Co., 71 NM 310, 378 P.2d 
130 (1963) 2 3 
li 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES(cont»d) 
Page 
Rhiness v. Dansie, 24 Ut 2d 375, 472 P.2d 
428 (1970) 7, 18, 
Sarti v. Udail, 91 Az. 24, 369 P.2d 92 (1962) . . 33 
State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1984) 15 
State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 
(1980) 16 
State v. Kay, 475 P.2d 541 (Utah 1970) 14 
State v. Malmrose, Utah, 649 P.2d 56, 60 (1982) . 16 
Swoboda v. Brown, (1935) 129 Ohio St. 512, 523, 
196 NE 274 28 
Tapia v. McKenzie, 85 N.M. 567 514 P.2d 618 
(1973) 23 
United States v. Affleck, 776 F.2d 1451 (10th 
Cir. 1985) 16, 17 
Vigue v. Noyes, 536 P.2d 713, 24 Az. App. 144 
vacated in part 550 P.2d 234, 113 Ariz. 
237 (1976) 31, 32 
Walter v. Southern Arizona School for Boys, 77 
Az. 141, 145, 267 P.2d 1076, 1080 (1954) . . 33 
Watzig v. Tobin, 292 Or. 645, 642 P.2d 651 
(1982) 19, 20 
Wilson v. Rule, 169 Kansas 296, 219 P.2d 690 
(1950) 23, 26 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Page 
34 ALR 2d 1285, at 1289 28, 29 
Title 10-10-3, U.C.A. 1953 7 
Title 41-6-38, U.C.A. 1953 19, 26 
iii 
OTHER AUTHORITIES(cont•d) 
Page 
Restatement of Torts Section 509, Comment E 
at 20 33 
South Carolina Statutes
 f Section 6-311/ Code 
of 1962 29 
IV 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES HORNSBY, 
Appellant-Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING 
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS 
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 
a Utah corporation sole, 
CHARLES GIBLETT, JOHN SUTTON, 
and JOHN DOES I through X, 
inclusive, 
Respondents-Defendants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS CORPORATION 
OF THE PRSIDING BISHOP OF 
THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST 
OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS AND 
CHARLES GIBLETT 
Appeal From Third District 
Court, Honorable Timothy Hanson 
District Court Judge 
No. C-83-5019 
Utah Supreme Court 
No. 860007 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff sued defendants for damages allegedly suffered 
as the result of a motorcycle accident March 30, 1983 at approximate 
7975 West 2820 South, Magna, Salt Lake County, Utah where plaintiff 
Hornsby overturned his motorcycle in an effort to avoid a cow 
that was crossing 2820 South from south to north (R. 890). 
The accident occurred during daylight hours, in clear weather 
and on a dry asphalt surface (R. 891). The heifer which belonged 
to the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of The LDS Church 
had been pastured (R. 650) on the property of defendant John 
Sutton for approximately thirty (30) days prior to the date 
of the accident (R. 631), and on that date was being loaded 
by defendants John Sutton and Charles Giblett, Church farmer, 
into Sutton's horse trailer (R. 634) for the purpose of returning 
it and another heifer to the Church property which was immediately 
to the west and north of the Sutton property and from which 
the two heifers had somehow gotten across the fences separating 
the properties, (R. 629, 630, 650, 673). 
One heifer entered the horse trailer (R. 662, 691). 
The second heifer threw its weight against the corral gate which 
was attached to the horse trailer by a hook (R. 598) and by 
four strands of baling wire (R. 658, 556) and was lodged behind 
the frame of the trailer (R. 658, 660) with such force that 
the animal "drove the gate right past the trailer" (R. 660) 
got through the gate (R. 662) and crossed 2820 South street 
in a southerly direction into a 30 acre field owned by Kennecott 
Copper Corporation (R. 663). For about an hour (R. 643) Mr. 
Giblett and two boys attempted to control the heifer in the 
Kennecott pasture without success, finding the animal "wasn't 
herdable" (R. 647), and just prior to the accident the heifer 
went through what was described as the Haslam property (R. 643), 
and onto 2820 South street Mr. Giblett being 150 to 200 feet 
behind (R. 665). At approximately the same time plaintiff Hornsby 
was returning to his home from his job at Kennecott taking an 
indirect route (R. 938) and traveling in an easterly direction. 
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John Sutton's daughter, Mary, had returned home from 
work after the heifer had left the Sutton premises (R. 775) 
and she in her car and her father in his truck (R. 561), drove 
up and down 2820 South and 80th West with their blinker lights 
flashing (R. 779, 584) in an effort to determine the location 
of the heifer and to assist in its containment (R. 777). Just 
prior to Mr. Hornsby's accident, Mary had stopped her automobile 
on the south side of 2820 South approximately 165 feet from 
the corner (R. 792) with the blinker lights flashing, both front 
and back, went to look for the cow, ran back to the car when 
she saw the cow coming (R. 780) and waved to Mr. Hornsby while 
standing on the hardtop of the traffic lane (R. 782) intending 
to warn him (R. 799) of the potential danger on the street from 
the heifer. Mary's view of the S curve was unobstructed (R. 
797 and she watched Hornsby making the S turn and traveling 
the 165 feet to her car. (R. 793) There is conflict in the 
testimony as to whether Mary was outside the vehicle as she 
testified (R. 791), or inside the vehicle, which was the testimony 
of Hornsby (R. 921, 923). 
Hornsby said his speed at the time of the accident was 
approximately 30 m.p.h. (R. 926) although he had slowed to 15 
to 20 m.p.h. (R. 935, 925) as he rounded the S curve just west 
of the accident scene. Mary Sutton said Hornsby was at or exceeded 
the speed limit at the time he passed her (R. 799, 806). At 
the time of the accident Hornsby was accelerating (R« 647) and 
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acknowledges that he saw Mary Sutton waving her arms (R. 923) 
but that he interpreted the signal to be a friendly greeting 
rather than a warning of impending danger (R. 924). 
The point where Hornsby laid down his motorcycle was 
210 feet easterly from Mary Sutton's parked car (R. 798, 579). 
After the accident/ while Hornsby was lying in the roadway he 
made statements in the presence of witnesses to the effect that 
he saw the girl waving but didn't understand what she wanted. 
(R. 796, 802, 586) 
The case was tried before a jury of eight persons (R. 
329) (not seven as erroneously reported in appellant's brief) 
over a period of four days. In response to special interrogatories 
the jury found no negligence on the part of any defendant but 
determined that plaintiff was negligent and that his negligence 
was the proximate cause of his injury (R. 334). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is the position of these defendants that the case 
was tried in an atmosphere of fairness and that the trial judge 
carefully conducted the voir dire examination which resulted 
in an unbiased jury. The evidence established that there was 
no departure from the standard of cattle loading within Salt 
Lake County and that in an effort to contain the escaped heifer 
defendants conducted themselves in a reasonably prudent manner 
which included the stationing of one of the defendants on the 
public road with the blinker lights on her vehicle flashing 
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and with said defendant (Mary Sutton) waving her arms to warn 
oncoming traffic. Plaintiff Hornsby saw the warning but failed 
to heed it. The jury had to determine whether a reasonable 
man would have misinterpreted the warning and found against 
the plaintiff. 
The religious affiliation of the jurors was not elicited 
in the voir dire examination, the judge intentionally refusing 
to do so. Defendants were "in the dark" as to the religious 
affiliation of the jurors as well as the plaintiff except for 
the jury foreman, Mr. Alex C. Lucero, who reported on the voir 
dire that he was an Assembly of God Minister (R. 958A). Neither 
defendants nor plaintiff struck him from the jury. In a case 
such as this where an animal belonging to a church was reputedly 
the cause of an injury it is not incumbent upon the court to 
determine of the prospective jurors membership or non-membership 
in the defendant church. As a matter of fact/ the mere determinatic 
of membership in the LDS Church would leave unanswered many 
other questions/ including the extent to which that person was 
active in his church through his attendance at meetings/ his 
payment of tithing or contributions, his holding of a temple 
recommend or a variety of other indicia of activity. These 
defendants contend that it is not proper for a court, in a case 
where religious doctrine or practices are not at issue, to inquire 
of religious affiliation. The voir dire question put the prospectiv 
jurors as to whether their "feelings either pro or con with 
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regard to the LDS Church would affect their ability to be fair 
and impartial jurors" together with the remainder of the voir 
dire as quoted in this brief constituted a fair and proper voir 
dire examination with respect to bias and prejudice as a result 
of religious affiliation. 
The plaintiff contends that counsel for these defendants 
improperly referred to the "welfare farm" during the trial. 
There is no record before this court of any caution or warning 
given to counsel by the court admonishing him to refrain from 
such reference. There was some discussion in chambers regarding 
the reference to the Church defendant as "the Church" and all 
counsel agreed that they would try to follow such admonition. 
The judge observed that he, himself, might fall into the trap 
and it became apparent throughout the trial that each counsel 
inadvertently made such reference. No Motion for Mistrial was 
made nor did the court take occasion to further admonish counsel 
either as to the use of the phrase "the Church" or the term 
"welfare farm". 
Plaintiff•s requested instructions to the jury contained 
instructions with respect to res ipsa loquitur, negligence per 
se, and strict liability. Counsel for all defendants argued 
that these instructions should not be given and the court refused 
to give them. The evidence during the trial had clearly established 
that this was not a case for res ipsa loquitur, the sole Utah 
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case on animals on the public highway (Rhiness v. Dansie, 24 
Ut 2d 375, 472 P.2d 428 [1970]) having determined that it was 
plaintiff's burden to show that the animals got upon the public 
highway through some specific act of negligence on the part 
of the defendants. The court had determined that plaintiff's 
proof did not establish any negligence on the part of the defendant 
Church which resulted in the heifer's being in Sutton's yard 
approximately thirty (30) days prior to the accident and so 
instructed the jury (Instruction No. 23) (R.365). The case, 
therefore, went to the jury on the issue of specific acts of 
negligence on the part of the defendants. Instruction No. 22 
(R.363/ 364) (See Addendum I) fairly put before the jury the 
acts of negligence complained of, to-wit; the negligent permitting 
of a cow upon a public highway, the duty to use reasonable care 
in loading as to prevent a cow from escaping, the duty to use 
reasonable care in confining or capturing an escaped cow, the 
duty to use reasonable care to warn motorists of the potential 
danger of cattle coming onto the highway, and the duty of one 
who voluntarily assists in attempting to warn motorists to use 
reasonable care in so assisting. 
The Utah statute (Title 10-10-3 U.C.A. 1953) making it 
a misdemeanor "to stay, tether, herd, graze, or pasture, or 
allow to run at large or cause to be staked, tethered, herded, 
grazed or pastured, or allowed to run at large any cow, etc. 
upon any public highway" was determined by the court to refer 
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to an intentional or permissive act and was not determinative 
of negligence in the case of "an escaped cow". It is defendant's 
position that they did not violate the statute in question under 
the facts of this case, and that plaintiff received all he was 
entitled to with respect to a proper jury instruction when the 
court gave Instruction No. 22 (R. 363) which instructed the 
jury that under the law of Utah "an owner of cattle or a person 
controlling the possession of cattle shall not negligently permit 
such cattle to be upon a public highway both sides of which 
are adjoined by property which is separated from such highway 
by a fence". The jury found no such negligent conduct on the 
part of any defendant. 
Finally, the proposed instruction with respect to strict 
liability has no place in this case because of the absence of 
evidence that the cow had any propensity likely to cause injury. 
In cases cited in this brief from other jurisdictions, the courts 
have refused to invoke the doctrine of strict liability even 
where animals "acted up", there having been no evidence of dangerous 
propensities theretofore. 
The finding of the jury that defendants were not negligent 
and that plaintiff was negligent as he approached the escaped 
cow, all determined by the jury within fifty (50) minutes of 
their commencement of deliberation, is not evidence of bias, 
prejudice, or an unfair trial. Rather, it is evidence of the 
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failure on the part of the plaintiff to convince the jury that 
the defendants had not acted "as reasonable men" at all times 
material to this case and further to convince the jury that 
plaintiff had acted "as a reasonable man" in his approach to 
the scene of the accident. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO REVERSIBLE ERROR BY THE 
TRIAL COURT JUDGE IN THE COURT'S VOIR DIRE 
EXAMINATION OF PROSPECTIVE JURORS REGARDING 
POTENTIAL PARTIALITY DUE TO INVOLVEMENT WITH 
THE DEFENDANT CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING 
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF 
LATTER-DAY SAINTS. 
Plaintiff cites Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of 
Baltimore/ 143 A.2d 627, 631 (MD 1958) claiming that there is 
reversible error when a court fails to allow voir dire questioning 
of prospective jurors as to their religious affiliation. Plaintiff 
has misinterpreted the case. In Caseyf supra at 631 the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland said, 
"the trial court ruled that the questions 
submitted by the plaintiff would not be asked 
because the effect, if not the intent, was to 
inquire into the jurors1 religious affiliations, 
which the court thought would be improper." 
The court then said 
"We do not say, or even intend to intimate, 
that the court was required to propound the 
precise questions submitted. The form of the 
questions to be asked is clearly within the 
sound discretion of the court. However, it 
is clear that the only question propounded by 
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the court was not sufficient to determine 
possible cause for disqualification by reason 
of bias or prejudice or otherwise. The question 
asked was in a form so general that it is likely 
it did not sufficiently indicate to the panel 
of jurors what possible bias or prejudice was being 
probed. 
If the [trial] court had deemed it necessary, 
it could have continued to examine the jurors, 
or any one of them, in the manner suggested 
in Bryant v. State, supra. By so doing the 
nature of the answer, if it disclosed cause 
for disqualification, would not necessarily 
have revealed the religious affiliation 
of the juror who made answer, and whether the 
juror was favorably or unfavorably disposed 
toward the . . . church or toward an adherent 
to its religious faith. Ld. at 631, 632. 
The court sustained the trial court's notion that probing 
into religious affiliation was not essential to precluding juror 
bias based on religious affiliation. The court simply held 
that the trial court's only question on the matter was too general 
and, therefore, not sufficient. 
Plaintiff in the present case sought voir dire which 
contained questions which were not necessary to the assurance 
of impartiality. Plaintiff claims he should have been allowed 
to question the jury regarding the following questions raised 
in his proposed voir dire (R. 325-328): 
"38. Did any of you hold a position in the 
L.D.S. Church such as Bishop or presiding 
officer or counselor? 
39. Which stake was that in? 
40. Where is that located? 
-10-
41. Would that position affect you in making a 
fair decision in this case? 
42. If the evidence were favorable to the 
plaintiff in this case, would you have a problem 
in awarding a judgment against the L.D.S. 
Church? 
43. Are any of you members of the L.D.S. 
Church? 
44. Would that, in any way, affect your ability 
to evaluate the evidence in this case and 
render a fair decision for the plaintiff? 
45. If the evidence is favorable for the 
plaintiff in this case, would you have a 
problem with entering a judgment against 
the L.D.S. Church?" 
In his brief at page 6, plaintiff claims he should also 
be allowed to ask: 
"Whether any attended the Oquirrh Stake from 
where the cow came. 
Whether any of them either volunteered at the 
subject farm or knew persons who had or did." 
As stated in Casey, supra, first, "the form of the questions 
to be asked is clearly within the sound discretion of the court." 
Secondly, it was the court's prerogative to ask the questions. 
Thirdly, plaintiff cannot show that answers to his ten questions 
would provide any greater assurance of impartiality than the 
trial court's questions set forth hereinafter. 
In Casey the court held that the trial court, in its 
questions regarding bias due to religious affiliation, should 
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have informed the prospective jurors of the parties, the nature 
of the case, and who the real defendant was. The court said 
the trial court should then have propounded a question inquiring 
if there was any reason why any juror could not arrive at a 
fair and impartial verdict based on the evidence to be produced 
and the law applicable to the case to be set forth. Casey, 
supra at 631. 
The court in the present case (See R. 1023-1025) said: 
" . . . Ladies and Gentlemen, there's a couple 
of other questions I want to ask you. As you're 
all aware, one of the Defendants in this case is 
the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, and 
it's none of this Court's business, or anybody's 
business what your religious preferences are. And 
I intend to ask no questions in that regard. But 
this is a civil matter; it's not a religious 
matter. It doesn't have anything to do with 
anybody's theories, or ideas, or beliefs with 
regard to religion. But I want to make sure there 
is no one on the jury who feels that they would 
have difficulty serving as a juror because of any 
strong feelings they may have one way or another 
with regard to the LDS Church. So let me ask the 
question this way: Are there any of you who feel 
that you would have trouble being an impartial 
juror because of feelings you may have either pro 
or con with regard to the LDS Church that you 
think might affect your ability to be a fair and 
impartial juror in this case? If so, I'd like you to 
raise your hand. 
The record will show that all members of the 
jury have indicated that that would have no effect 
on their decision one way or the other. All 
parties, Ladies and Gentlemen, regardless of 
whether they are a religion, or a business, or 
what position an individual may hold in the commu-
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nity, are entitled to equal justice under our 
system of law. And it's very important that all 
members — parties receive a fair and impartial evaluation 
of their rights and responsibilities/ 
and their conduct by a jury regardless of their 
station in the community. You've all indicated 
that you would do that. 
Couple other general questions, Ladies and 
Gentlemen. These are only questions that you can 
answer by looking at your own state of mind, and 
your own thoughts regarding things, because we 
can't look into your mind. But let me ask you 
this: Is there any reason that we have not yet 
discussed — if we've already talked about it, 
obviously we don't need to go over it again — is 
there any reason we have not yet discussed that 
you think might affect your ability to be a fair 
and impartial juror in this case? If so, I'd like 
you to raise your hand. The record will show that 
none of the prospective panel have so indicated. 
Let me ask the same question another way. Ladies 
and Gentlemen, if I can, if you were a party to 
this suit, if you were the Plaintiff, Mr. Hornsby, 
or if you were the Defendant, the LDS Church, or 
Mr. Giblett or Mr. and Mrs. Sutton — Mr. and Ms. 
Sutton, if you were a party to this lawsuit, and 
knowing your own state of mind as potential jurors 
in this case, are there any of you who would be 
dissatisfied, or feel uncomfortable having a juror 
of your like thinking at the present time sitting 
in judgment of your case? In other words, would 
you be satisfied if all eight jurors that were 
going to decide your case had the same frame of 
mind about things, and the same willingness, or 
lack thereof, to follow the law on the facts, and 
decide your case. If so, Ifd like you to raise 
your hand if you would have difficulty with a 
juror like yourself on your own jury if you were 
here as a party. 
The questions asked by the court clearly meet the criteria 
in Casey and were clearly sufficient to probe bias based upon 
religious affiliation. 
Plaintiff further asserts at page 6 of his brief that 
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"Because of the large LDS Church population, the 
probability of a juror holding a position of 
leadership in the Church is great. Therefore, it 
was very likely that a juror would perceive that 
plaintiff was suing 'my Church'." 
A juror need not be an officer in a church to know whether 
"his" church is a defendant. Plaintiff implies by this statement 
and by his proposed question number 38, supra, that the mere 
holding of office in the LDS Church is sufficient to establish 
bias in the officeholder serving as a juror. His proposed question 
number 43 supra, implies that mere membership in a church is 
sufficient to establish bias. 
Such an argument was rejected in State v. Kay, 475 P.2d 
541 (Utah 1970). In that case, the defendant appealed a lower 
court's conviction in a criminal case where six of eight jurors 
were members of the victim church and where each had satisfied 
the trial court 
"he would not be biased or prejudiced by virtue of 
his church membership, nor would he give more or 
less credit to a witness who was a member of the church." 
id-
Defense counsel in that case argued, 
"The unfairness of a Mormon sitting in judgment of 
one charged with wrongdoing concerning his church 
and his own property seems patently clear." 
In affirming the lower court, the Utah Supreme Court declared, 
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"This quoted language appears to be an indictment 
of every Mormon that is so unspecific and sweeping 
as to amount to what we consider to be an ecclesi-
astical non sequitur. It is an ipse dixit that 
imputes to every Mormon, or for that matter, every 
Catholic, every Protestant, and every Jew, ad 
infinitum, a congenital, ingrained or adopted 
dishonesty where his church's property and his own 
property are involved. The leveling of such a 
charge is as unorthodox and ungracious as the 
charge itself. We cannot accept defendant's 
premise on any legal, social, economic or 
religious grounds." 
A concurring opinion stated: 
"The defendant's lawyer asserts that he can 
represent the client fairly because he has taken 
an oath as a lawyer to do so. It seems that he 
refuses to ascribe to the jurors the same degree 
of moral integrity which he arrogates unto 
himself. Honesty should compel him to believe 
that each juror would be mindful of his own oath 
to render a just and true verdict according to the 
law and the evidence." 
Plaintiff cites State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1984) 
as holding that religious affiliation must be inquired into 
in order to give him information desirable in exercising 
peremptory challenges. 
The court in State v. Ball, narrowly held that asking 
a venireman whether his abstention from the drinking of alcohol 
has a religious basis is not prohibited by the Utah constitution. 
Id. at 1060. The court stressed that "we do not examine the 
scope of permissible grounds for a challenge for cause relating 
to claimed bias solely by reason of a person's adherence to 
specific religious beliefs . . . " The court also noted, 
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"Several state courts have expressed the view that 
caution must be exercised to prevent the use of 
peremptory challenges to accomplish covertly what 
cannot be done overtly, namely, the denial of 
equal protection to groups of prospective jurors 
and of cross-sectionalism of juries to criminal 
defendants. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 
Cal.Rptr. 890f 583 P.2d 748 (1978); State v. 
Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (1980). See 
also McCray v. Abrams, 576 F.Supp. 1244 9E.D.N.Y. 
1983). That caution is appropriate and most 
certainly formed part of the motivation for the 
language in our constitution excluding religious 
beliefs or the lack thereof as a ground for dis-
qualification of jurors. 
The gathering of sufficient relevant information 
must, of course, be pursued with a sensitivity to 
the privacy of the potential juror. The criminal 
defendant's right to a fair trial does not create 
a license in his defense counsel to conduct an 
inquisition into the private beliefs and experi-
ences of a venireman. The trial judge, in his 
broad discretionary power to conduct voir dire, 
State v. Malmrose, Utah, 649 P.2d 56, 60 (1982), 
Maltby v. Cox Construction Co., Utah, 598 P.2d 
336, 341 (1979), has a duty to protect juror 
privacy." JEd. at 1059, 1060 
Plaintiff cites United States v. Affleck, 776 F.2d 1451 
(10th Cir. 1985) with the apparent intent of showing that the 
trial court's submission of a forty-four page questionnaire 
to 116 potential jurors is authority for his own request. The 
Affleck court said the trial court included questions in its 
questionnaire "about the person's religious affiliation." No 
mention is made as to the number or wording of the questions. 
Even with the questionnaire and with oral voir dire by 
both the court and by counsel of the 77 who were available for 
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oral voir dire, only three potential jurors were dismissed for 
expressing their opinion as to appellant's guilt. There is 
no indication that the results would have been otherwise without 
the questionnaire. 
The Affleck court also said: 
"To hold that the mere existence of any precon-
ceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an 
accused/ without moref is sufficient to rebut the 
presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality 
would be to establish an impossible standard. It 
is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his 
impression or opinion and render a verdict based 
on the evidence presented in the court." Ic[. at 1455. 
Plaintiff argues that reference to the words "stake president 
"church relationship", and "brethren" during the trial was inherentl 
prejudicial. Plaintiff fails to explain how or why such use 
of the common identifying vernacular would cause or force a 
juror to abandon impartiality. 
Plaintiff argues that jury deliberation of fifty minutes 
is sufficient to infer prejudice. Plaintiff fails to show any 
authoritative basis for such inference. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS NO REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ALLOWING DEFENSE COUNSEL 
TO REFER TO HIS CLIENT AS "THE WELFARE FARM. 
Plaintiff claims the record shows defense counsel used 
the term "welfare" in violation of a prior order of the court 
not to do so. Neither the citations given nor the record support 
that claim. Nevertheless, defense counsel's use of the term 
"welfare farm" would not constitute prejudicial reference to 
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the defendant as a "welfare" institution and is not grounds 
for reversible error. 
If the term "welfare" was used by counsel to describe 
the farm in question by its commonly known public designation 
there could be no misconduct. The term "welfare farm" can evoke 
a variety of images in the minds of jurors according to their 
individual experiences. The word "welfare", does not necessarily 
portray a picture of a "penniless defendant". It is unlikely 
that people in this State would accept such a picture. Utah 
jurors are drawn from areas where the term "welfare farm" is 
of common usage. Its use likely evokes an image of a Church 
property where LDS members go to help produce commodities to 
assist the needy. 
If plaintiff believed the use of the term "welfare farm" 
evoked an image in the mind of any juror which did or could 
cause that juror to abandon impartiality, counsel should have 
objected or made a motion for a mistrial. No objection or motion 
was made. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE AN INSTRUCTION 
ON RES IPSA LOQUITUR. 
Plaintiff's brief fails to cite the only Utah Supreme 
Court case on the subject of res ipsa loquitur as it applies 
to escaped animals on the public highway. In Rhiness v. Dansie, 
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supra this court dealt with an automobile-horse collision in 
Spanish Fork Canyon. The plaintiffs in that case had been unable 
to establish any specific act of negligence and at the conclusion 
of their evidence the trial judge granted defendant's Motion 
for a directed verdict. Title 41-6-38 U.C.A. 1953 (See Addendum 
II) provided that: 
"No person owning . . . any livestock, shall 
. . . negligently permit any such livestock 
to stray upon . . . a public highway, both 
sides of which are adjoined by property which 
is separated from such highway by a fence, wall, 
hedge, sidewalk, curb, lawn or building; 
. . . In any civil action brought by the owner, 
driver or occupant of a motor vehicle . . . 
where damages caused by collision with any domestic 
animal or animals on a highway, there is no 
presumption that such collision was due to 
negligence on behalf of the owner . . . 
of such livestock." 
This court held that: 
"In order for the plaintiffs to recover in this 
action, they must show two things: first, 
that the highway was fenced on both sides; and 
second, that the horses got upon the highway 
through the negligence of the defendant. 
The mere fact that the animals escaped from 
the enclosure is not sufficient evidence 
standing alone, to justify the submission 
of defendant's negligence to the jury." 
The quoted section from Title 41 is still the statutory 
law of the State of Utah. Both the statute and the Rhiness 
case clearly negate the notion that the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur should apply in this state in connection with cattle 
on the public roads. The Oregon case of Watzig v. Tobin 642 
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P.2d 651 (1982) cited by plaintiff which appears to approve 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as applicable to cattle on 
the public highway, can be readily distinguished on its facts. 
In that case7 the evidence did not establish how the cow had 
escaped its enclosure. In the instant case the manner in which 
the cow escaped was clearly established by the testimony. The 
issue that was placed before the jury had to do with the loading 
practice of the defendants and whether that loading practice 
met the standard as demonstrated by what reasonable men as cattle 
loaders did within Salt Lake County. In Watzig, it was held 
that for the purposes of that case, the only element of res 
ipsa loquitur which must be proved is that "the accident must 
be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence 
of someone's negligence" (specifically eliminating two other 
elements of res ipsa loquitur which had previously appeared 
in Oregon cases). The court stated at page 655: 
"The conclusion which must be drawn to render 
the doctrine applicable is not whether 
a cov/ can escape such an enclosure, but 
rather whether a jury could reasonably find, under 
the evidence, that it is more probable than not 
that the escape of the cows would not normally 
occur in the absence of negligence and that 
the negligence was that of the defendants." 
Such mental gymnastics need not be indulged where it is known 
how the cow escaped and the facts regarding the loading procedure 
are presented in detail as in the instant case. The Oregon 
court further observed at page 656: 
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"Although we do not hold that res ipsa 
loquitur applies to every case in which a cow 
escapes from an enclosed area and enters 
a public highway, under the facts of this 
case, a jury could conclude that the cows 
would not have escaped in the absence of 
negligence and that negligence which caused 
their escape was that of the defendants. 
Res ipsa loquitur was applicable." 
The above wording indicates that the applicability in 
cattle cases of res ipsa loquitur in Oregon, was limited to 
the facts of the Watzig case. 
Plaintiff cites the recent case of Kusy v. K-Mart Apparel 
Corporation, 681 P.2d 1232 (Ut., 1984) as authority for the 
applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. In that 
case it was observed that the "plaintiff cannot point to an 
individual event or practice of defendants that produced the 
defective condition in the particular pallet that broke and 
caused this accident". The court further stated: 
"At the second trial, the court must decide 
if a res ipsa instruction is appropriate on 
the basis of the evidence submitted there. 
Assuming plaintiff can prove that the pallet 
broke and caused his fall, but cannot point 
to the specific act that caused the pallet to 
break, a res ipsa instruction could be appropriate. 
However, if the evidence goes so far as to 
explain the precise cause of the break, res 
ipsa is no longer necessary and therefore 
would be inappropriate, (citing cases)" 
The Utah court adopted language from the Kansas decision 
Ballhorst v. Honor-Foreman-Caley, Inc., 207 Kan. 89, 484 P.2d 
38 as follows: 
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"We further (hold) that res ipsa loquitur 
should not be removed by proof of specific 
negligence unless the proof goes so far as 
to fully explain the cause of the injury 
by positive evidence revealing all of the 
facts and circumstances." 
It is submitted that in the instant case the evidence 
did go far enough to explain the cause of the injury by positive 
evidence revealing all of the facts and circumstances. 
It is interesting in the discussion of the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur in Kusy/ supra/ that this court requires as 
elements of the applicability of res ipsa loquitur the following: 
"(1) That the accident was of a kind which, in 
the ordinary course of events, would not have 
happened had due care been observed; (2) 
that the plaintiff's own use or operation of 
the agency or instrumentality was not primarily 
responsible for the injury; and (3) that the 
agency or instrumentality causing the injury 
was under the exclusive management or control 
of the defendant." 
It cannot be said in the instant case that the cow escaping 
from the enclosure was primarily responsible for plaintifffs 
injury in view of the evidence of plaintiff's inattention to 
the warning of Mary Sutton and his accelerating his motorcycle 
as he passed the warning vehicle, nor can it be shown that the 
escaped cow was "an agency or instrumentality causing the injury" 
under the exclusive management or control of the defendant when 
plaintiff proceeded, as the evidence disclosed, past a warning 
individual and vehicle into the path of the cow. 
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In support of defendants1 position that the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable is the case of Brauner 
v, Peterson/ 16 Wash. App. 531, 557 P.2d 359 (1976). The Washington 
Court stated at page 361: 
"With regard to res ipsa loquitur, the presence 
of an animal at large on the highway is not 
sufficient to warrant application of the rule, 
i.e., the event must be of a kind not ordinarily 
occurring in the absence of someone's negli-
gence. A cow can readily escape from perfectly 
adequate confines (citing Wilson v. Rule, 169 
Kansas 296, 219 P.2d 690 [1950]). Thus, the 
first of the three elements essential for appli-
cation of res ipsa loquitur is not present.11 
In the case of Tapia v. McKenzie, 85 N.M. 567 514 P.2d 
618 (1973), the New Mexico court stated: 
"Because plaintiff's case was grounded on the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur he had the burden 
of proving the two elements necessary to its 
application: (1) that the cow (the instrument-
ality in this case) was under the exclusive 
control of the defendants; and (2) that this 
accident was of the type which ordinarily does 
not occur in the absence of negligence (Mitchell 
v. Ridgeway, 77 NM 249, 421 P.2d 778 (1966). 
Mere proof of the occurrence of an accident 
is not sufficient to invoke the res ipsa 
loquitur doctrine. Renfro v. J.D. Coggins 
Co. 71 NM 310, 378 P.2d 130 (1963). 
The evidence adduced in support of the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur is substantially similar to 
the evidence developed in Akin v. Berkshire (NM 
Ct. of App.) 512 P.2d 1261, decided July 18, 
1973. We held there that while there was no 
question that the cow was under the exclusive 
control of the defendant, plaintiff had not 
shown that the cow-car accident in that case 
was 'of the type which ordinarily does not 
occur in the absence of negligence'. Likewise, 
plaintiff here has not sustained his burden 
of proof on this element." 
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The case of Barnes v. Frank 472 P.2d 745 (Ct. of App. 
Col., 1970) developed out of a collision between an automobile 
in which plaintiff was riding and animals on the highway owned 
by defendant. The animals had been kept in a field adjoining 
the highway, enclosed within the confines of an electric fence. 
Plaintiff had alleged that the defendant "negligently allowed 
several of his cattle to escape onto and remain on a public 
highway". At the pre-trial the plaintiffs had stated that they 
were unable to specify the particular negligent act of the defendant 
which allowed the cattle to escape but that under the circumstances 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable and that the 
burden is on the defendant to satisfy the jury that he was not, 
considering all the circumstances, negligent in allowing the 
cattle to escape". At the trial the plaintifffs counsel conceded 
that plaintiff was unable at this time and did not anticipate 
being able to specify the particular negligent act of the defendant 
which allowed the cattle to escape. The trial court dismissed 
the action on the ground that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
was not applicable. The court of appeals affirmed stating that: 
"For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
to be applicable it must appear (1) that 
the instrumentality is under the exclusive 
control of defendant, (2) that the accident 
is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur 
in the absence of defendant's negligence, 
and (3) that it must not have been due to 
any voluntary act or contribution on the 
part of the plaintiff. 
Applying these standards to the present 
situation, it is clear that the requirement 
of (2) above is not satisfied. 
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The fact that the cattle were on the highway 
does not in and of itself make defendant 
liable or raise a presumption of negligence 
against the defendant* The cattle may 
have entered on the highway because of 
any number of factors, including possible 
acts of third persons. The duty rests 
upon plaintiff to prove defendant was negligent 
by a preponderance of the evidence. When 
the plaintiff stated to the court in circum-
stances such as we have here that she 
'will not present evidence of any specific 
act of negligence on the part of the defendant1 
the court has no alternative but to dismiss 
her complaint." 
In Reed v. Molnar, 67 Ohio St. 2d 76, 423 NE 2d 140 (Ohio, 
1981) the Ohio Supreme Court held that: 
"(1) Cattle owners could not be held strictly liable 
in tort; 
(2) Although statute prohibits one from 
permitting domestic animals to run at large on 
a public way, doctrine of negligence per se 
was not applicable; 
(3) Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply.11 
We will refer to this case in our argument respecting negligence 
per se hereafter, but on the issue of res ipsa loquitur the 
Ohio Court stated: 
"To warrant application of the rule 
a plaintiff must adduce evidence in 
support of two conclusions (1) that the 
instrumentality causing the injury was, at the 
time of the injury, or at the time of the creation 
of the condition causing the injury, under the 
exclusive management and control of the defend-
ants; and (2) that the injury occurred under 
such circumstances that in the ordinary course 
of events it would not have occurred if ordinary 
care had been observed, (citing cases) 
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A division of authority exists on the question 
of the applicability of res ipsa loquitur to 
animal escape cases. Without passing on the 
first branch of the foregoing test we find 
that it may not be said that the presence of 
unattended cattle on the public highway is 
an occurrence that would not have materialized 
absent someone's negligence. Thus, the doctrine 
is inapplicable and appellants were not prejudiced 
by the trial courts refusal to instruct the jury 
on res ipsa loquitur. 
In coming to this conclusion we are not 
unmindful of the legislative recognition 
implicit in R.C. 951.09 that animals may 
escape without fault or negligence of their 
owners. Similarly, there has been judicial 
recognition that cattle and other domestic 
animals can escape from perfectly adequate 
confines (Wilson v. Rule, supra and 
Barnes v. Frank, supra)." 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GIVE AN INSTRUCTIO 
ON NEGLIGENCE PER SE. 
The argument heretofore made with respect to the applicabilit 
of the Utah case law (Rhiness v. Dansie, supra) and the statute 
cited, Title 41-6-38 U.C.A. (1953), applies equally to the theory 
of negligence per se. Utah law is clear that a person is not 
negligent merely because animals owned by him or in his possession 
are "unattended on the highway". There is a distinction between 
herding or "allowing an animal to run at large" and the fact 
situation in the instant case where an animal had escaped its 
enclosure and was neither being "herded" or "allowed to run 
at large" in the sense of the wording of the state statute or 
county ordinance. In Reed v. Molnar, supra the Ohio court treated 
the applicability of three statutes. R.C. 951.02 provided: 
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"A person, firm, or corporation which is the 
owner or has charge of horses, mules, cattle, 
sheep, goats, swine, dogs or geese, shall 
not permit them to run at large in the public 
road, highway, street, lane, or alley or upon 
unenclosed land. . . . The running at large of 
any such animal in or upon any of the places 
mentioned in this section is prima-facie evidence 
that it is running at large in violation of this 
section.11 
R.C. 951.09 provided in part: 
"It is a sufficient defense to such prosecution 
(for violation of 951.02) to show that the animal 
was at large without the knowledge or fault of 
its owner or keeper." 
R.C. 951.10 provided in part: 
"The owner or keeper of an animal described in 
section 951.02 of the revised code, who permits 
it to run at large in violation of such section 
is liable for all damages caused by such 
animal upon the premises of another without 
reference to the fence which may enclose such 
premises. . . . " (emphasis added) 
The Ohio court stated: 
"Where there exists a legislative enactment 
commanding or prohibiting for the safety of 
others the doing of a specific act and there 
is a violation of such enactment solely by 
one whose duty it is to obey it, such violation 
constitutes negligence per se; but where there 
exists a legislative enactment expressing for 
the safety of others, terms, a rule of 
conduct, negligence per se has no application 
and liability must be determined by the 
application of the test of due care as 
exercised by a reasonably prudent person 
under the circumstances of the case. (Eisenhuth 
v. Moneyhom [1954] 161 Ohio St. 367, 
119 NE 2d 440, paragraph 3 of the syllabus) 
(emphasis added) 
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Where a statute imposes a specific requirement 
or duty, the jury need only determine whether 
a prohibited act was committed or a required 
act was omitted, to find the violator of the 
statute negligent per se. But where duties 
are defined (in the statute) or are defined only 
in abstract or general terms, leaving to the 
jury the ascertainment and determination of 
reasonableness and correctness of acts and 
conduct under the proven conditions and circum-
stances, the phrase negligence per se has no 
application.11 (Swoboda v. Brown, (1935) 129 Ohio St. 
512, 523, 196 NE 274) 
The court concluded: 
"The statute did not impose a requirement 
of an absolute and specific nature justifying 
application of the doctrine of negligence 
per se. The statute prohibits the owner 
or keeper of certain domestic animals, 
including cattle from 'permitting1 such 
animals to run at large on public highways." 
34 ALR 2d 1285, at 1289 the court stated: 
"Where the particular statute involved provides 
that the owner shall not 'permit . . . his 
animals to run at large1, the courts have 
generally held, or recognized, that statutes of 
this type are not violated in the absence of 
at least negligence by the owner of the animals." 
(emphasis added) 
In the case of McCullough v. Gatch 161 SE 2d 182 (S.C. 
1968) the Supreme Court of South Carolina determined that the 
mere presence on the highway of an unattended cow with which 
an automobile collided was insufficient to support a conclusion 
that there had been a violation of a statute providing that 
"it is unlawful for the owner or manager of any domestic animal 
of any description willfully or negligently to prevent any such 
animal to run at large beyond the limits of his own land," where 
there was no evidence that the defendant had been guilty of 
any negligent act or omission. 
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A South Carolina statute Section 6-311, Code of 1962 
provided: 
"It shall be unlawful for the owner or manager 
of any domestic animal of any description will-
fully or negligently to permit any such animal 
to run at large beyond the limits of his own 
land or the lands leased, occupied or controlled 
by him. Any owner, manager, or person violating 
the provisions of this section shall be subject 
to a fine for each offense of not more than 
$25.00 or to imprisonment for not more than 25 
days." 
Commenting upon this statute the Court stated: 
"It is at once apparent that this statute does 
not impose an absolute duty to prevent the 
escape of livestock from the owner's custody 
and control. At least negligence in permitting 
the animals to stray is of the essence of the 
proscribed conduct. Some evidence from which 
an inference of such negligence may be drawn 
is required. The mere presence of unattended 
animals on a highway is insufficient to support 
a conclusion that the statute has been violated." 
The court further stated: 
"For decisions from other jurisdictions involving 
statutes, of varying verbiage, making it unlawful 
to permit livestock to run at large, see 
annotation 34 ALR 2d 1285. Concerning statutes 
of similar tenure to ours, the annotator says at 
page 1291: 'Authority is hardly required to 
support the proposition that negligence is a 
minimum prerequisite to liability under statutes 
prohibiting the owner of domestic animals from 
willfully (knowingly, voluntarily) or negligently 
permitting such animals to run at large." 
POINT V 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE 
AN INSTRUCTION ON STRICT LIABILITY. 
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Plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 15 (Addendum 6 
of Appellant's Brief) was refused by the trial judge. The instructic 
talks about propensities likely to cause injury and knowledge, 
and awareness by the owner of such dangerous propensities. 
The evidence in this case did not justify such an instruction 
to the jury. There was no evidence that the heifer had a dangerous 
propensity which could cause harm nor that it was in any sense 
a "renegade" cow (as described in plaintiff's brief). The evidence, 
on the contrary was to the effect that none of defendants had 
notice that there was anything unusual or dangerous about this 
heifer only that it was excited as it was being loaded which 
was common to cattle during loading operations (R.633, 550). 
The fact that it had previously gotten into defendant Sutton's 
property from the Church property (along with another heifer 
that was safely loaded into the horse trailer) was not sufficient 
to submit this issue of "dangerous propensity" to the jury. 
Further, the evidence with respect to the loading of the heifer 
from all witnesses at the scene negated any notion that this 
particular heifer was unusual or hard to control. The heifer 
had been contained for approximately one month in Sutton's pasture 
and had not been returned to the Church property for the reason 
that such activity might affect Sutton's cattle some of which 
were carrying calves, and not for any reason involving the heifer 
in question. 
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The case of Vigue v. Noyes, 536 P. 2d 713, 24 Az. App. 
144 vacated in part 550 P.2d 234, 113 Ariz. 237 (1976) cited 
by plaintiff, held that: 
"If a person who harbors or possesses domestic 
animals likely to do harm unless controlled, 
does not have reason to know that the animal 
is abnormally dangerous, such person is 
liable for harm done by the animal only 
if harm is of a sort which is normal for 
animals of its class to do, and if the 
person fails to exercise reasonable care 
to confine or otherwise control the animal.11 
In the instant case there was no evidence that defendants had 
reason to know of any dangerous propensity of the heifer. 
In Macho v. Mahowald, 374 NW 2d 312 Ct. of App. Minn. 
(1985) the plaintiff sought damages for an injury sustained 
when he fell off defendant's horse which bolted immediately 
after he mounted it. The jury found plaintiff 40% negligent 
and the defendant 60% negligent. The trial court entered judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict finding that the facts were insufficient 
to place defendant on notice that the horse had a dangerous 
propensity. 
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case because 
the appellate court disagreed with the trial court that a prior 
incident was insufficient to indicate a dangerous or vicious 
propensity. There had been one previous incident in which defendant 
daughter had been riding the horse and it broke into a run and 
she jumped or fell off. Defendant believed that the horse wanted 
to run to an adjacent alfalfa field at the time of that incident. 
The appellate court held that: 
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"The previous incident was the kind of evidence 
from which the jury could have found that the 
horse had a propensity to be dangerous (citing 
cases)." 
In the instant case there is no evidenct of such a previous 
incident. In Macho there was a dissent in which Judge Sedgwick 
agreed with the trial court that "the one incident did not give 
rise to a duty to warn. Absent this duty there was no negligence." 
The dissent quoted Vigue v. Noyes (supra) where an unattended 
horse kicked a child in the head in a corral. The Arizona court 
found that the fact that the horse damaged his stall by kicking 
flies, ate well, occasionally 'crow hopped1 (stopped suddenly 
with stiff front legs) causing the rider to slide, and acted 
'funny1 on the day of the accident did not establish viciousness." 
The dissenting judge quoted other cases from Washington and 
New York in a similar vein. 
In the case of Flynn v. Lindfield, 6 Ariz. App. 459, 
433 P.2d 639 (1967) cited by plaintiff, a 15 year old girl employed 
as a baby sitter at a country home or ranch where livestock 
was kept was injured in an encounter with a mare. The Arizona 
court commented upon the theory of strict liability and particularly 
a previous incident which plaintiff claimed put the defendant 
on notice of the dangerous propensity of the mare in question. 
The court stated: 
"It is the law in Arizona that any person who 
keeps or harbors a domestic animal with 
knowledge of its vicious tendencies or propensities 
is liable in damages to another for any injury 
caused by it unless it is shown that the 
injured person, with knowledge of its 
viciousness, did something to such animal 
which caused it to injure him (citing cases). 
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The determinative factor here is knowledge or 
vicious propensities, and this question must 
be viewed in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiff. Sarti v. Udall, 91 Az. 24, 
369 P.2d 92 (1962) Here there was evidence 
that approximately three weeks before the 
plaintiff's injury, while the mare was being 
loaded on a horse trailer, the animal jumped 
out and f took a couple of swings' at one of the 
persons handling her, . . . 'reared up and 
came down on him' and in going over the side 
of the trailer 'cut her chest all up1. There 
is nothing in the record indicating that the 
defendants did not know of any dangerous 
propensities in this mare other than the 
testimony of the plaintiff herself who said that 
on previous occasions she and the children had 
been into the corral to visit the animal 
and had petted the colt without any adverse 
reaction from its mother. 
We see no basis of recovery here under a 
strict liability theory because of the natural 
tendency of a mare to protect her colt. 
This is a normal hazard connected with the 
raising of a commonly kept domestic animal 
and gives rise to no special liability though the 
duty to exercise reasonable care to protect others 
from the normal characteristics of such an 
animals obtains. 
(citing Restatement of Torts Section 509, 
Comment E at 20)" 
The court went on to explain, however, that: 
"it has been held that even one 'previous 
incident* is sufficient to take a case to 
the jury under the doctrine of harboring 
an animal with 'vicious propensities'. 
Walter v. Southern Arizona School for Boys, 
77 Az. 141, 145, 267 P.2d 1076, 1080 (1954). 
Whether the one incident of misconduct on the 
part of the mare which was witnessed by the 
plaintiff is sufficiently 'vicious' to meet 
this test, we do not pass upon, because of 
the procedural posture of this case." (emphasis 
added) 
-33-
Thus, the Flynn case does not make a determination one 
way or the other as to whether one incident of misconduct was 
sufficient to meet the "vicious propensity" test. In any event, 
where is the incident of misconduct in the instant case? 
It is submitted that there is no statute or case law 
in Utah to the effect that cattle are ferocious animals by nature. 
In the absence of any prior incident from which a jury could 
determine that defendants had actual notice of a vicious propensity 
in the particular heifer, it was proper for the trial court 
to refuse an instruction on strict liability. 
CONCLUSION 
These defendants contend that the voir dire examination 
by the court of the prospective jurors in this case was thorough 
and proper and resulted in an unbiased jury. Defendants further 
submit that it would have been improper for the trial judge 
to inquire into the religious affiliation of the prospective 
jurors in this type of case where the doctrines or practices 
of the LDS Church were not an issue. There was no improper 
conduct on the part of counsel for these defendants. The requested 
jury instructions on the issues of res ipsa loquitur, negligence 
per se and strict liability were properly refused under the 
facts of this case. Plaintiff was given a fair trial under 
instructions permitting the jury to find any or all of the defendant 
negligent in their conduct in loading the cattle, attempting 
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to contain the heifer after it escaped, and in the manner of 
giving warning to oncoming traffic. The jury decided that defendants 
were non-negligent but that plaintiff was negligent in his approach 
to the accident scene. The judgment of the trial court based 
upon the special verdict should be affirmed. 
DATED this ^Lo day of June, 1986. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. V ^ 
You are instructed that the law in Utah requires 
that an owner of cattle or a person controlling the possession 
of cattle shall not negligently permit such cattle to be upon 
a public highway, both sides of which are adjoined by property 
which is separated from such highway by a fence; however, even 
where cattle or a cow has come onto the highway from a fenced 
area, there is no presumption that such occurred due to the 
negligence of the owner or a person controlling the possession 
of the cattle or a cow. 
As this law applies to this case you are instructed 
that the defendants Charles Giblett and John Sutton had a duty 
to use reasonable care in loading the cattle or cow so as to 
prevent the cattle or cow from escaping and further that once 
the cattle or cow escaped, defendants Charles Giblett and John 
Sutton had a duty to use reasonable care to capture or confine 
said cattle or cow and in doing so to use reasonable care to 
warn motorists of the potential danger of the cattle or the 
cow coming onto the highway. 
Although defendant Mary Sutton initially had no 
duty to assist the other defendants in attempting to warn 
motorists, once defendant Mary Sutton voluntarily rendered her 
services in attempting to warn motorists, she had a duty to 
exercise reasonable care to warn motorists of the potential 
danger of the cattle or cow coming onto the highway. 
-36-
GQ0363 
Although there is no presumption that any of the 
defendants were negligent merely because an accident occurred 
involving a near collision between plaintiffs motorcycle and 
the cattle or cow that had come onto and was upon the highway 
at the time of the accident in question, if you find that any 
of the defendants failed to exercise reasonable care in 
carrying out these duties and if you further find that the 
plaintiff James Hornsby was required to lay down his motorcycle 
because of such failure of the defendants, then you could find 
that the defendants were negligent. 
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ADDENDUM II 
Utah Code 1985-1986/ Title 41-6-38 
Livestock on Highway - Collison/ Action for Damages. 
No person owning or controlling the possession of any 
livestock, shall willfully or negligently permit any such livestock 
to stray upon or remain unaccompanied by a person in charge 
or control thereof upon a public highway, both sides of which 
are adjoined by property which is separated from such highway 
by a fence, wall/ hedge, sidewalk/ curb/ lawn or building; provided/ 
that the foregoing provision shall not apply to range stock 
drifting into any such highway in going to or returning from 
their accustomed ranges. No person shall drive any such livestock 
uponf over or across any public highway during the period from 
half an hour after sunset to half an hour before sunrise, without 
keeping a sufficient number of herders with warning lights on 
continual duty to open the road so as to permit the passage 
of vehicles. In any civil action brought by the owner, driver 
or occupant of a motor vehicle or by their personal representative 
or assignees/ or by the owner of the livestock for damages caused 
by collision with any domestic animal or animals on a highway, 
there is no presumption that such collision was due to negligence 
on behalf of the owner or the person in possession of such livestock 
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